Delight Springs

Thursday, February 20, 2014

Digital dawn, fake design, false expression

Our first peripatetic class day was an apparent success, proving again Nietzsche's dictum: the best ideas come while walking. I'm reassured that our Study Abroad Walking Tour of Britain will work.

“Now shall I walk or shall I ride?" asked W.H. Davies. 'Ride,' Pleasure said; 'Walk,' Joy replied.” But either is preferable to sitting in a stuffy classroom when it's Spring in February.

A new dawn awaits us in Bioethics today, specifically Craig Venter's account of the "dawn of the digital age of biology." O brave new world!


In A&P our next chapter from Alex Rosenberg begins with the man whose inflexible likeness I greeted just last weekend. He says Sir John's Templeton Foundation (that's the English patrician "Sir," not the "Suh" of his Winchester TN nativity) always finds plenty of physicists to reward and remunerate for "affirming life's spiritual dimension," but that biologists are beyond all that.

I wonder why they've not honored Professor Dawkins, then? He's a biologist. His Unweaving the Rainbow was the first book we ever read in this course, steeped as it is in the naturalistic and humanistic spirit.

Or exo-biologist Sagan? As Dawkins put it, appealing to the sense of wonder in science was his special forte.
The feeling of awed wonder that science can give us is one of the highest experiences of which the human psyche is capable. It is a deep aesthetic passion to rank with the finest that music and poetry can deliver. It is truly one of the things that makes life worth living and it does so, if anything, more effectively if it convinces us that the time we have for living is finite.
From what he's told us so far, Alex Rosenberg just doesn't feel it. How sad for him, not to realize that spirit means breath, and breath means life.

And how sad for benighted biologists and any other contrarians laboring under the misapprehension that learning more of life's detailed codes renders their product banal or, indeed, less than wondrous.

So if the Templetons are serious about seeking reconciliation between science and religion (which Rosenberg repudiates), they really should give their award to an exemplar of atheistic, humanistic, naturalistic spirituality. John (End of Science/Rational Mysticism) Horgan, feeling queasy about having accepted Templeton money a few years ago, agrees:
the foundation should state clearly that it is not committed to any particular conclusion of the science-religion dialogue, and that one possible conclusion is that religion — at least in its traditional, supernatural manifestations — is not compatible with science. To demonstrate its open-mindedness, the foundation should award the Templeton Prize to an opponent of religion, such as Steven Weinberg or Richard Dawkins. At the very least, the foundation should post this essay on its Web site.  
It's still not there, as of this a.m.

As for Rosenberg's repeated claim that biology (hence all life, including ours) is devoid of explicit conscious purpose: that may be true of lower-order species still solely reliant upon instinct, but how can it possibly be true of a species intelligent enough to raise and ponder and write about the issue in the first place?

Unless epiphenomenalism is to be rehabilitated we must proceed on the assumption that our deliberations will generate purposes, and actions in their pointed pursuit that must influence the course of events in our life-world. Life per se and in the abstract may lack purpose, but intelligent life can't leave home (or return) without it. That's the real purpose-driven life, the perennial "darting to an aim" (as Emerson put it), shooting the gulf of meaning day after godly day in perpetual transition to a new state. Evolution does not pursue a goal, but the members of an intelligent evolving species do. That's what keeps them going. "Life only avails, not the having lived." That's not nihilism, Alex.

Here would be a good place to revisit Flanagan. "Scientism is the brash and overreaching doctrine that everything worth saying or expressing can be said or expressed in a scientific idiom... The simple and obvious point is that not everything worth expressing can or should be expressed scientifically. Scientism is descriptively false and normatively false."

But let's not leap to conclusions. Rosenberg's not finished having his say, yet, and Saganism's waiting in the wings.

Wednesday, February 19, 2014

Anselm to Rawls

It's more Saints today in CoPhi, and more Harvards: Anselm & Aquinas (with commentary on the latter from Anthony Kenny), Robert Nozick, and John Rawls.


Anselm stumped for the divine moral perfection (and omnipotence and omniscience) of a being “than which none greater could be conceived.” His Ontological Argument is either ingenious or ridiculous, depending on who you ask. But it rarely persuades those who do not come at it armed with antecedent faith. "Faith seeking understanding," or maybe just the appearance of rational cover.

Aquinas was sure there had to be an uncaused cause in back of everything, or else we’d never get to an end of explaining. Well, we probably won’t. Not ’til the would-be explainers themselves are gone. But is an uncaused cause really a step forward, explanatorily speaking?

Both of those guys were committed, of course, to belief in a heavenly afterlife. Samuel Scheffler, in the Stone recently, wrote of the afterlife here. Here, of course, is where people live the lives their beliefs inform. Life, not god or supernaturalism, is the natural impulse behind religion. Dewey's continuous human community is another way of naming nature's afterlife.

But what if you learned that the species would expire within a month of your own passing? That's Scheffler's thought experiment. He thinks he and we would be profoundly unsettled, that life would suffer an instant meaning collapse, and that this shows how invested we all are in a natural afterlife for humans (though not each of us in particular) on earth. He thinks "the continuing existence of other people after our deaths -- even that of complete strangers -- matters more to us than does our own survival and that of our loved ones." That's what he means when he begins his essay: "I believe in life after death."

He also explained his view on Philosophy Bites.

Our old dead Italian Saints said nothing about this, so far as I'm aware. Anthony Kenny does say Aquinas still agreed with Aristotle about "the best way to spend your lifetime down here on Earth," that happiness is ultimately an activity rather than a feeling, and that "the supreme happiness for rational beings was an intellectual activity." To Aristotle's standard "pagan virtues" he added faith (in Christian revelation), hope (for heavenly ascent), and charity (toward god and neighbor).

But the charity he seems to admire most in Aquinas is of the intellectual variety, "always trying to balance arguments from both sides" and treat those whose conclusions he disputes with civility.


Neither of today's 20th century Harvard philosophers was a Saint, but both were civil.
Robert Nozick began his academic career as a narrow analyst and wunderkind libertarian, but evolved well beyond his starting place. He came to realize that astringent libertarianism neglects "the reality of our social solidarity and humane concern for others." He came also to the view that "thinking about life is more like mulling it over" than like pinning it with a syllogism. "It feels like growing up more." He kept growing, 'til stomach cancer took him at age 63.
Nozick's chapter on dying in The Examined Life begins,
THEY SAY NO ONE is able to take seriously the possibility of his or her own death, but this does not get it exactly right. (Does everyone take seriously the possibility of his or her own life?) A person's own death does become real to him after the death of both parents.
He's right about that.
Before his death (as Yogi Berra might have said) Nozick gave us the good old Experience Machine. We just talked about this the other day in HAP 101.

John Rawls, says Carlin Romano, wrote "the most important book of English-language political theory since Mill's On Liberty. His goal was a coherent theory of "justice as fairness" whose appeal would span the spectrum, after emerging from behind a "Veil of Ignorance." Not everyone buys it, but we all talk about it. Michael Sandel does too, to a much bigger class than ours, albeit mostly virtual & MOOCy.
And now there's a musical stage show. How many political philosophers can say that?!  Rawls@dawn

Tuesday, February 18, 2014

Venter's Life, Rosenberg's Reality

We begin new texts today in both Bioethics and A&P.

Craig Venter's Life at the Speed of Light: From the Double Helix to the Dawn of Digital Life begins with the simplest of questions, borrowed from Erwin Schrodinger: "What is life?"

(Does it occur to anyone else, at this point, to quote Douglas Adams' Marvin ("the paranoid android"): Life! Don't speak to me of life... Or, "This is the sort of thing you life forms enjoy, is it? I ask merely for information.")

We'll try to decide, in the weeks ahead, if their mutual answer that life is patterned information (with DNA as its "code-script" or software) is too simple. But nobody will ever accuse our author of humility. "When we announced our creation of the first synthetic cell, some had asked whether we were 'playing God'... God was unnecessary for the creation of new life, [so] I suppose that we were."

The job seemed available.

Alex Rosenberg's Atheist's Guide to Reality: Enjoying Life Without Illusions will strike many as similarly hubristic and even less humble. Another Blue Devil, Rosenberg differs from his colleague Flanagan in not only not disdaining scientism ("the conviction that the methods of science are the only reliable ways to secure knowledge of anything") but actually embracing it, and finding the expressive (non-assertive) "stories" of non-scientists irrelevant and distracting. He bites that bullet and grins through it.

Those who've been 'round the block in my classes before will anticipate my early line on all this: Flanagan's pragmatic pluralism expressed the right temper of receptivity to multiple stories as generating their own appropriate universes of discourse, reflecting a Jamesian "Hands Off" attitude that frowns on reductive attempts to say that anything (including knowledge) is "nothing but X." Rosenberg's scientism, by contrast, is obnoxiously self-congratulatory and unimaginative towards the meaningful possibilities of various ways of being human.

I wonder if Rosenberg's read "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings" or attempted to absorb its wisdom?
It absolutely forbids us to be forward in pronouncing on the meaninglessness of forms of existence other than our own; and it commands us to tolerate, respect, and indulge those whom we see harmlessly interested and happy in their own ways, however unintelligible these may be to us. Hands off: neither the whole of truth nor the whole of good is revealed to any single observer, although each observer gains a partial superiority of insight from the peculiar position in which he stands. Even prisons and sick-rooms have their special revelations. It is enough to ask of each of us that he should be faithful to his own opportunities and make the most of his own blessings, without presuming to regulate the rest of the vast field.
Or Pragmatism?
There is no RINGING conclusion possible when we compare these types of thinking, with a view to telling which is the more absolutely true. Their naturalness, their intellectual economy, their fruitfulness for practice, all start up as distinct tests of their veracity, and as a result we get confused. Common sense is BETTER for one sphere of life, science for another, philosophic criticism for a third; but whether either be TRUER absolutely, Heaven only knows. 
But my early line is drawn in sand. I want to measure it against our later texts, and wonder if the kinder and gentler-sounding scientism of Sagan will in fact play out all that differently. I wonder, too, if Flanagan's and James's and my versions of pluralism "defend experience against philosophy" as diligently as they should, if they aim to differentiate themselves sharply from Rosenberg's certitude.

As Richard Powers' Thassadit Amswar said, knowingly, in Generosity: I'll try not to decide more, yet, than God.

Or Darwin and Dawkins and Venter.



Monday, February 17, 2014

Augustine to Quine

Happy Presidents' Day. Just another day at the office for your working philosopher. 

But I must take a moment to appreciate the wonderful weekend getaway up the mountain my family arranged, to commemorate the hanging of yet another year on my line. 

Our rental was comfy as could be, it was a stone's throw or two from Sewanee, Walker's & Shelby's storied teahouse, and (we discovered) the late Sir John Templeton's  incongruously located "library." And who was he? An ardent proponent of reconciliation between faith and reason,

a Tennessee-born investor and philanthropist who amassed a fortune in global stocks and gave away hundreds of millions of dollars to foster understanding in what he called "spiritual realities"...  [His] foundation awards the Templeton Prize, one of the world's richest, and sponsors conferences and studies reflecting the founder's passionate interest in "progress in religion" and "research or discoveries" on the nebulous borders of science and religion... [obit] 

After a photo-op with John's statue I was met by a contrarian, at the door, who insisted the the Library was in fact a private residence. 



Speaking of faith and reason...

It's Augustine, Boethius, Santayana, Dewey, and Quine today in CoPhi.


Is anyone, from God on down, “pulling our strings”? We’d not be free if they were, would we? If you say we would, what do you mean by “free”? Jesus and Mo have puzzled this one, behind the wheel with with Moses...
jandmofw
..and with "Free Willy." But as usual, the Atheist Barmaid is unpersuaded.

(As I always must say, when referencing this strip: that’s not Jesus of Nazareth, nor is it the Prophet Mohammed, or the sea-parter Moses; and neither I nor Salman Rushdie, the Dutch cartoonists, the anonymous Author, or anyone else commenting on religion in fictional media are blasphemers. We're all just observers exercising our "god-given" right of free speech, which of course extends no further than the end of a fist and the tip of a nose. We were celebrating precisely that, and academic freedom, when we lined up to take turns reading the Constitution late last summer.

They’re just a trio of cartoonish guys who often engage in banter relevant to our purposes in CoPhi. It’s just harmless provocation, and fun.  But if it makes us think, it’s useful.)

Augustine proposed a division between the “city of god” and the “earthly city” of humanity, thus excluding many of us from his version of the cosmos. “These two cities of the world, which are doomed to coexist intertwined until the Final Judgment, divide the world’s inhabitants.” SEP

And of course he believed in hell, raising the stakes for heaven and the judicious free will  he thought necessary to get there even higher. If there's no such thing as free will, though, how can you do "whatever the hell you want"?  But, imagine there's no heaven or hell. What then? Some of us think that's when free will becomes most useful to members of a growing, responsible species.

Someone posted the complaint on our class message board that it's not clear what "evil" means, in the context of our Little History discussion of Augustine. But I think this is clear enough: "there is a great deal of suffering in the world," some of it proximally caused by crazy, immoral/amoral, armed and dangerous humans behaving badly, much more of it caused by earthquakes, disease, and other "natural" causes. All of it, on the theistic hypothesis, is part and parcel of divinely-ordered nature.

Whether or not some suffering is ultimately beneficial, character-building, etc., and from whatever causes, "evil" means the suffering that seems gratuitously destructive of innocent lives. Some of us "can't blink the evil out of sight," in William James's words, and thus can't go in for theistic (or other) schemes of "vicarious salvation." We think it's the responsibility of humans to use their free will (or whatever you prefer to call ameliorative volitional action) to reduce the world's evil and suffering. Take a sad song and make it better.

Note the Manicahean strain in Augustine, and the idea that "evil comes from the body." That's straight out of Plato. The world of Form and the world of perfect heavenly salvation thus seem to converge. If you don't think "body" is inherently evil, if in fact you think material existence is pretty cool (especially considering the alternative), this view is probably not for you. Nor if you can't make sense of Original Sin.

Bertrand Russell, we know, was not a Christian. But he was a bit of a fan of Augustine the philosopher (as distinct from the theologian), on problems like time.


As for Augustine the theologian and Saint-intraining, Russell's pen drips disdain.
It is strange that the last men of intellectual eminence before the dark ages were concerned, not with saving civilization or expelling the barbarians or reforming the abuses of the administration, but with preaching the merit of virginity and the damnation of unbaptized infants.
Russell liked Boethius, or aspects of his thought at least. Boethius was also perplexed by time, and initially unimpressed by the alleged capacity of timeless divinity to accommodate both omniscience and free will. Like Russell, I'm struck by this "singular" thinker's ability to contemplate happiness (he thought all genuinely happy people are gods) while practically darkening death's door.

Boethius was consoled by the thought that God’s foreknowledge of everything, including the fact that Boethius himself (among too many others) would be unjustly imprisoned and tortured to death, in no way impaired his (Boethius’s) freedom or god's perfection. Consoled. Comforted.Calmed. Reconciled.

That’s apparently because God knows things timelessly, sees everything “in a go.” I don’t think that would really make me feel any better, in my prison cell. The real consolation of philosophy comes when it contributes to the liberation of mind and body (one thing, not two). But it’s still very cool to imagine Philosophy a comfort-woman, reminding us of our hard-earned wisdom when the going gets impossible.


And then, of course, they killed him. The list of martyred philosophers grows. And let’s not forget Hypatia and Bruno. The problem of suffering (“evil”) was very real to them, as it is to so many of our fellow world-citizens. You can’t chalk it all up to free will. But can we even chalk torture or any other inflicted choice up to it, given the full scope of a genuinely omniscient creator’s knowledge? If He already knows what I’m going to do unto others and what others will do unto me, am I in any meaningful sense a free agent who might have done otherwise? The buck stops where?


George Santayana was a Spanish-American philosopher at Harvard, not quite a pragmatist but a good representative of the Euro-American strain of classic American philosophy. He gave us one of our most quoted unattributred quotes: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." (Life of Reason) 

William James described Santayana's Platonic perfectionism as "the perfection of rottenness," and Santayana himself as a man determined never to enjoy his eggs at breakfast. (Santayana countered that James seemed to think all eggs were good just "because the hen has laid them," i.e., because they're real and not ideal.)

Eggs aside, Santayana has been called "a pessimist in an optimist's country." Others called him "supercilious, vain and offensive." Bertrand Russell apparently thought him "a prissy queen and a prig." I'd just call him a masterful and elegant writer of sophisticated prose, a naturalist and materialist and a skeptical observer of life, and a delightful aphorist who said there's no cure for life and death, save to enjoy the interval. Also that it's better to love all the seasons in turn, rather than be exclusively and hopelessly in love only with Spring.

John Dewey (1859-1952) is one of my heroes. I love what he said about the continuous human community.

W.V.O. Quine (1908-2000) was not one of my heroes. But I enjoy recalling the time I hung out with him in the kitchen.

Thursday, February 13, 2014

Fling away the book

It's exam day in Bioethics and A&P. My perennial best advice is still WJ's:
If you want really to do your best in an examination, fling away the book the day before, say to yourself, “I won’t waste another minute on this miserable thing, and I don’t care an iota whether I succeed or not.” Say this sincerely, and feel it; and go out and play, or go to bed and sleep, and I am sure the results next day will encourage you to use the method permanently. William James, “Gospel of Relaxation"

If you’ve been up all night cramming, in other words, good luck. You’ll need it. But if you’ve been diligent, have steeped yourself in the subject all semester long, and either went out to play or to an early bed the night before, your luck will be the residue of design. You’ll do fine. Relax.

But don’t try too hard to relax.
It is needless to say that that is not the way to do it. The way to do it, paradoxical as it may seem, is genuinely not to care whether you are doing it or not.

Care later. Today just show up and do your best.

HTStudy.com… HTStudy.org…HTReadABook

Wednesday, February 12, 2014

Stoics & pragmatists

Happy Darwin Day, again! The man with the greatest idea anyone ever had (says Dan Dennett) was born 205 years ago today. Hoping to visit his home this summer, and take students there in '15. Stay tuned.


It’s a terse and breezy reading assignment in Little History today in CoPhi, on the Stoics Epictetus, Cicero, and Seneca. Should leave us plenty of time to reflect on the meaning and context of these squibs, before getting on with the next chunk of America the Philosophical:
 ’Being philosophical’ simply means accepting what you can’t change, for instance the inevitable process of growing older and the shortness of life. 
‘Stoic’ came from the Stoa, which was a painted porch. 
Like the Sceptics, Stoics aimed for a calm state of mind. Even when facing tragic events, such as the death of a loved one, the Stoic should remain unmoved. Our attitude to what happens is within our control even though what happens often isn’t. 
Stoics think we are responsible for what we feel and think. We can choose our response to good and bad luck… They believe emotions cloud reasoning and damage judgment. 
Epictetus started out as a slave. When he declared that the mind can remain free even when the body is enslaved he was drawing on his own experience. 
The brevity of life and the inevitability of aging were topics that particularly interested Cicero and Seneca. 
Cicero said old people can spend more time on friendship and conversation. He believed the soul lived forever, so old people shouldn’t worry about dying. [Epicurus already told us they needn't worry in any event.]
For Seneca the problem is not how short our lives are, but rather how badly most of us use what time we have. 
The Stoic ideal was to live like a recluse… studying philosophy and get[ting] rid of those troublesome emotions. 

But Nigel Warburton‘s question is right on target: at what price? If you’re even half human, like Mr. Spock, you’ll only damage yourself by suppressing your affective side. Calm may not be the greatest good, after all.
Anyway, Roman philosophy is under-rated. The Romans have done a lot for us.


And not all emperors were so bad as Nero. Marcus Aurelius was actually quite sane, and humane.

In AtP, Carlin Romano today addresses the symbolic and philosophical significance of the U.S. Constitution. We observed Constitution Day back in August (an example of what Michael Walzer considers a culturally-distinctive invented American occasion when we rally 'round "a totemic object for patriotic celebration"), and I joined many of my fellow Blue Raiders in a public reading on our campus. It was oddly moving. But that document is, after all, a human creation. It's too often exalted as beyond challenge, as though its authors (the Founders) were divine, as though they were the only Americans entitled to possess constitutional intent. Walzer's right, we do sometimes treat the nation itself as our civic religion. I saw a bumper sticker on my commute home last night: "Blind faith in bad leaders is not patriotic." Nor is blind allegiance to dead people. We must open our eyes and minds and have the courage to think. Sapere aude.

Is it true that the writers of our Constitution, under the influence of Locke and Hume,  "largely asserted, rather than argued, their fundamental philosophical beliefs?" If so, the "founders' intent" school of judicial conservatism stands all the more exposed as a naked and fallacious appeal to past  authority rather than a sound argument for judicial restraint in the present.

Gordon Wood, who spoke at Older Daughter's school back in August to mark the Constitution's 226th birthday (Romano notes the centenary squabble as to whether that's really right, btw), called the Constitution "an aristocratic [document] designed to curb the democratic excesses of the Revolution."

One thing's indisputable: "most of us do not adequately understand the Constitution." We take unblinking and unthinking pride in it, thus excusing ourselves from thinking hard about the continuing and specific relevance of the views of old dead guys from the 18th century to a rapidly changing 21st century world. But, I'd hate to see what might happen to academic freedom on campus without it.

Romano then begins giving us a quick canonical history of pragmatism in America. We start today with Emerson, Peirce, and James. All three were pragmatic to the core, insofar as they valued new experience over inherited dogma and tradition, and urged a flexible philosophy more practically suited to the times in which it actually unfolds. But Emerson and James were also stoical in temper, committed to adapting themselves and their respective philosophies to external conditions in ways conducive to the pursuit of happiness. Peirce, ever prickly and (in James's words) "unsociable of intellect," seems not to have been cut out for that pursuit.

Last year in CoPhi, we read John Lachs's Stoic Pragmatism and welcomed the author to our classrooms to explain why Stoics and Pragmatists are not, contrary to popular assumption, natural opponents. "One of the great joys of my life is to think..." He was a tough act for Romano to follow, in November. 

"Emerson dealt with trouble [and family tragedy] by turning to life." His optimism wasn't easy.

C.S. Peirce was a brilliant, bumptious, and frequently "debauched metaphysician" who returned James's generous tribute with insult and "pragmaticism." But his insistence on "not pretending to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts" remains one of the smartest pillars of wisdom ever articulated. If you ask me. 

And he's a good model for a class of CoPhilosophers, believing truth to be "a communal project" -- "the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate." Notice the confident faith in a stable reality inherent in that formulation. But what if agreement never comes? That's ok, he'd say, we'll come closer if we try.

William James, of the notorious James boys, was both (in his own pragmatic language) tough and tender-minded, intelligent and confident, open and tolerant and (unlike CSP) highly sociable. His story as a philosopher begins with his discovery of the now-obscure Frenchman Renouvier and the power of attentive will, "the sustaining of a thought because I choose to when I might have other thoughts." 

What a great slogan he started out with: "My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will." Seems to have worked out for him, and for pragmatism. 

Tuesday, February 11, 2014

Spirituality naturalized

In Bioethics we're taking a study-and-reflection day, between texts. We'll recap Campbell's Basics, look at some links, work on group reports, and get ready for next week's commencement of Life at the Speed of Light. Sounds ambitious. Are we trying to play Craig Venter?

start

Speaking of Godlessness, today in A&P we'll put The Really Hard Problem of meaning for atheist-materialists behind us. There's an excellent discussion of the issue in Julian Baggini's very short introduction to Atheism, a very good little book we read two years ago inA&P.  His "heathen manifesto" echoes Owen Flanagan on many points. 
Many people do not understand that it is possible to lead a meaningful, happy life as a heathen, but we maintain that it is and can point to any number of atheist philosophers and thinkers who have explained why this is so. But such meaning and contentment does not inevitably follow from becoming a heathen. Ours is a universe without guarantees of redemption or salvation and sometimes people have terrible lives or do terrible things and thrive. On such occasions, we have no consolation. That is the dark side of accepting the truth, and we are prepared to acknowledge it. We are heathens because we value living in the truth. But that does not mean that we pretend that always makes life easy or us happy. If the evidence were to show that religious people are happier and healthier than us, we would not see that as any reason to give up our convictions.

Flanagan defends the expressive rights of the religious, but insists that assertion be more circumspect and evidence-driven. His final paragraph on naturalized spirituality and transcendence points us constructively towards our next texts, beginning with his fellow Blue Devil Alex Rosenberg's Atheist's Guide to Reality and proceeding to Christopher Hitchens' Mortality and Carl Sagan's Varieties of Scientific Experience. 
Happiness, flourishing, and meaning reside in the vicinity of embodying ideals of the human good that connect me to a goal beyond my own personal desires, and that are inclusive of all actual and future persons (possibly of all sentient beings)...
It's a big, meaningful, natural cosmos, we're at home in it, and that's something to sing about. How much more spiritual do we need to get?

Well, we could pull up a pew at the School of Life or (closer to home) Sunday Assembly.

Monday, February 10, 2014

A skeptic and a hedonist at the APA

Maybe throw in a stoic or a cynic and we'll have the perfect set-up for a classic-cliche joke. But, no need. The APA is always funny, whatever the attendance.

In CoPhi today it's Pyrrho the deep skeptic,  Epicurus the hedonist (though applying that label to him indiscriminately, as his critics did and do, can be misleading) and seeker of simple pleasures and happiness; and APA the behemoth that tried to eat philosophy. 

No Philosophy Bites on our syllabus today, but here's an interesting discussion of skepticism (or scepticism, as the Brits have it) from the excellent BBC4 program "In Our Time." And with Valentine's Day approaching, you may want to check out their recent show on Plato's Symposium, and an earlier one on the Philosophy of Love. And Epicureanism. 

Speaking of V'day, remember to bring cake and candy, or biscuits and jam, for teacher on Thursday (or Wednesday). And for everybody else too, of course. Exams are scheduled, but that's no reason to postpone a party. (Did you see Paul and Ringo in the Ed Sullivan theater last night?) Thanks to Older Daughter for bringing herself and John Green for a pre-V'day celebration this weekend. He rightly notes in his Fault in Our Stars epigraph that water and time dissolve everything. Meanwhile, as Mr. Emerson said, the days are gods. Still crazy after all these years.

I'm also still accepting housewarming gifts for my new office. But, back to the set-up for that philosophy joke:

What an amusing fantasy mental image to visualize: toga-clad old Greek and Roman wisdom-seekers roaming the Baltimore or Boston or Atlanta Marriott, amidst all those smoldering pocketed pipes and raggedy patched tweeds and all that careerist angst at the American Philosophical Association's Eastern Division meeting in December. I'd skip a post-Xmas visit with the family in St. Louis, to see that. 


Actually I did attend a Central Division APA at the St. Louis downtown Marriott back in the '80s. (It was the Whitey Herzog era, "What a Team/What a Town/What a Time!" booster banners dotted the streets. Better red than dead, they were.) Spotted no obviously-Pyrrhonic skeptics or Epicurean hedonists. But, philosophers behaving badly, being obtuse about credit card swipes and obnoxious about "the fine points of life?" Oh yes indeed. 


I'm not a big fan of professional philosophy conferences, though I've done my share of APAs and TPAs and SAAPs etc. They're necessary for "networking" and maintaining professional relationships and collegial friendships. But skype and other new communications technologies have begun to supplant the demeaning   job "meatmarket" function of these conferences. Good riddance. 


On the other hand, I do cherish the bizarre memory of strolling through a Vegas casino en route to Bill McKibben's SAAP keynote on the environment in 2000. Euguene, Oregon. Lexington, Kentucky. Milwaukee. New Jersey. College Station. Bakersfield. I've been everywhere, man...


Well, Carlin Romano's point is that the time has come to "think differently and more inclusively" about philosophy in America. It's not just for us card-carrying APA pros anymore. Thankfully so.


Today's AtP reading concludes at the outset of a discussion of the ideas of political philosopher Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars et al), who says our national identity (in contrast to most nations) is largely invented rather than inherited. The Constitution itself, and the Constitution Day public reading thereof which I proudly participated in, on our campus back in the Fall, is a prime example of what he means.


I caught Walzer on the radio recently. He argued for a U.S. military strike in Syria. (I hope nobody in Washington in still seriously contemplating that. As they might have sung at the Beatlefest last night, give peace a chance. All I'm sayin'.) What a pleasant surprise, for a change, to find our leaders apparently opting to give diplomacy and peace a chance before letting the bombs fly. On the other hand, he's right: we can't afford to turn a blind eye to children being murdered, anywhere. The whole world should be watching.



Back to Pyrrho and Epicurus... but first a quick follow-up on Plato and Aristotle. Check out this version of School of Athens.

As for Aristotle’s eudaimonia, in some ways it anticipated Epicurus’s garden and what Jennifer Michael Hecht calls “graceful-life philosophies” that proclaim in all simplicity: “we don’t need answers and don’t need much stuff, we just need to figure out the best way to live.” Then, and only then, will we be happy.

As for Pyrrho: If you’d asked him Who rules the Universe?, he might have replied: Lord knows. Cats, again. And pigs.
pig 

Reminding us of Pyrrho’s famous pig, who impressed Montaigne by riding out a storm at sea with much greater equanimity (and, crucially, much less comprehension) than his human shipmates, and of J.S. Mill’s declaration that it’s “better to be a human dissatisfied than a pig satisfied,” Hecht comments: “This whole pig-versus-philosopher debate is pretty hilarious, yes?”

Yes. But I agree with Spinoza and Hecht. “The happiness of a drunkard is not the happiness of the wise,” though of course there are happy occasions when it has its place too. Bottom line: “Knowledge and wisdom are worth it,” it can be everything to have found true love and meaningful work, and both– all-- can end in a flash, without warning. Stay on your toes, but don’t fret too much about the storm.
piranha
One more little animal image for Pyrrho, whose name I prefer to pronounce compatibly with this mnemonic trick: just remember that a pyrrhonic skeptic is like a piranha fish, toothily devouring every proposed candidate for belief. Cats and pigs too, probably.

And as for Epicurus, Jennifer Hecht‘s got his number. It’s listed.
For an Epicurean, somewhere there are beings that are truly at peace, are happy… The mere idea of this gentle bliss is, itself, a kind of uplifting dream. After all, we human beings know a strange thing: happiness responds to circumstances, but, basically, it is internal. We can experience it when it happens to come upon us; we can induce it with practices or drugs; but we cannot just be happy.

No, we must work to “solve the schism” between how we feel and how we want to feel. Happiness is a choice and a lifetime endeavor, and though it comes easier for some than for others there are tips and tricks we can use to trip our internal happy meters and achieve ataraxia, peace of mind, simple contentment, “tranquillity, or the freedom from disturbance and pain that characterizes a balanced mind and constitutes its first step toward the achievement of pleasure.”

Stop fearing the harmless and remote gods, Epicurus said. Stop fearing your own death, it’s not (as Wittgenstein would echo, millennia later) an event you’ll ever experience. “Life is full of sweetness. We might as well enjoy it.”

*Sissela Bok calls Epicurus a hedonist, but that's only technically correct. Yes, he said pleasure's at the heart of happiness. But what kind of pleasure?

A happy life is tranquil, simple, loving, and above all free from pain, fear, and suffering, available to all regardless of social status, nationality, or gender. Such a life of pleasure, Epicurus held, would of necessity have to be a virtuous one; ...


That’s Alain de Botton, author of a text I used to use in this course, and controversial proponent of religion for atheists. (Don’t confuse him with Boethius.) His interview with Krista Tippett was instructive. Like Jennifer Hecht, he wants us to use philosophy to enhance our bliss and sweeten our dreams.

Pyrrhonian deep skepticism and moral/cultural relativism share a common root. Simon Blackburn voices the right reply to those who say we can function without beliefs, or without discriminating between better and worse beliefs, when he points out that this is simply impractical and socially dysfunctional. Not only might you get run over by a racing chariot or step off a cliff, you also scatter seeds of discord within your community and perhaps even your family.

So I too “would defend the practical importance of thinking about ethics on pragmatic grounds.” To pretend  with “Rosy the Relativist” that we can all simply have and act on our own truths, our own facts, without confronting and negotiating our differences and critically evaluating our respective statements of (dis)belief, really is “farcical.” Lord knows.

I’ve been thinking some more, btw, about a student’s question whether Oprah is a philosopher. I’d say she has philosophical moments, sometimes asks the hard questions, and is indeed seeking to have and share a “graceful” (if opulent) life. So, sure. Same for the poets (like Whitman) who let us off the hook for contradicting ourselves (“I contain multitudes.”) I don’t think the Philosophy Club should be exclusive or restrictive. Many of my colleagues would disagree, amongst themselves, at their annual association meetings and in their ivory towers. They’ll never give me a car, either.

Anyway: we won’t suffer a meaning deficit, though, if we live simply and naturally in the company of friends who’ll help us conquer our fears and address our many questions about life, the universe, and everything. That’s the Epicurean way, when we decide nature’s already provided enough for our peace of mind and our contentment. That’s ataraxia.

So finally there are these dots, connecting Epicurus and Pyrrho:
Epicurus, though no friend to skepticism, admired Pyrrho because he recommended and practiced the kind of self-control that fostered tranquillity; this, for Epicurus, was the end of all physical and moral science. Pyrrho was so highly valued by his countrymen that they honored him with the office of chief priest and, out of respect for him, passed a decree by which all philosophers were made immune from taxation.

Tranquility and a free ride: now that would make me happy. A free ride to the APA, not so much.

Thursday, February 6, 2014

Moving on

Moved office yesterday, down the hall into the marginally smaller but windowed office recently vacated by a colleague who prefers a few interior square feet to natural light and an open vista. Now I look up from my desk and screen to trees and sky, and feel as though my workspace and headspace has expanded exponentially. I'm happily transplanted.

I'm also worn out. So many trips up and down the hall, schlepping my two-wheeler's overload of bookcases, books, and the detritus of more than a decade's ratpacking. I'd pretty well covered all four walls, too, with pictures and posters and cartoons and post-its and all. Seems like one of our student workers might have thought to ask if I could use a hand.

This would not be a good time for my wife to raise again the question of moving house.

But I can't wait, now, to arrive at my desk in the morning. That's worth a few aches and pains.

When I get to my desk I'll dig in to Alastair Campbell's last chapter, on Bioethics and Justice, and to Owen Flanagan's penultimate chapter (my Honors lecture audience on Monday was apparently challenged to grasp the meaning of that word, btw) on"Neuroscience, Happiness, and Positive Illusions."

Here's a positive belief that may well prove harmlessly illusory: my new space will make me a better teacher and a happier human.

And here's a firm prediction: I won't voluntarily move office again, ever. Not without "Three Guys and a Truck." Or at least one diligent student worker.