In the mud with the earth of things

 One of the things Rorty's critics in the ranks of academic philosophy seem to find most galling about his stance is what they perceive as his disrespect for their discipline, the suggestion that philosophers are no more or less capable of addressing our big questions about god, freedom, mortality, truth etc. than (say) literary critics. His last appointment at Stanford, after all, was in comparative literature.

I have no problem with Rorty's literary affinity, and unlike some of my colleagues I find nothing deflating about the link to literature. A sympathetic peer yesterday referred approvingly to the Rortian notion that philosophy is "in the mud" with literary (and other) studies, reminding me of a recent exchange in which we agreed that fiction often exceeds formal philosophy in its relevance and probity. Richard Powers's Bewilderment is a good example. (Thanks for the Shakespeare & Co. link, AC, I'll listen as soon as I can tear myself away from Five Questions... Still trying to answer #5. What am I afraid of?) 

So I reminded my sympathetic peer:

As noted here recently, being "in the mud" with literature is not a bad place for a pragmatic philosopher to be. Better to describe it, though, as WJ did, as being in touch with "the earth of things" rather than enchanted by "the glories of the upper ether."

But to be clear, a Jamesian pragmatic pluralist has no quarrel with those who entertain enchanted ethereal dreams and fantasies. Each room on the pragmatic corridor has its own claim to occupancy. Those who refuse to maintain contact with the earth of things, though, are neglecting our most vital question* concerning the future of life. The increasingly near, increasingly imperiled future of this world.

*The really vital question for us all is, What is this world going to be? What is life eventually to make of itself? The centre of gravity of philosophy must therefore alter its place. The earth of things, long thrown into shadow by the glories of the upper ether, must resume its rights. To shift the emphasis in this way means that philosophic questions will fall to be treated by minds of a less abstractionist type than heretofore, minds more scientific and individualistic in their tone yet not irreligious either. It will be an alteration in 'the seat of authority' that reminds one almost of the protestant reformation. And as, to papal minds, protestantism has often seemed a mere mess of anarchy and confusion, such, no doubt, will pragmatism often seem to ultra-rationalist minds in philosophy. It will seem so much sheer trash, philosophically. But life wags on, all the same, and compasses its ends, in protestant countries. I venture to think that philosophic protestantism will compass a not dissimilar prosperity. Pragmatism, Lec. III